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Of Suicide Machines, Euthanasia Legislation,
and the Health Care Crisis
DAVID R. SCHANKER*
Helping another person to die is presently against the law. You may think
this is a stupid, unreasonable ban but we live in a society under the rule of
law so we have to be careful about what we do.'
The moment had come. With a nod from Janet I turned on the ECG and
said, "Now." Janet hit the Mercitron's switch with the outer edge of her
palm. In about ten seconds her eyelids began to flicker and droop. She
looked up at me and said, "Thank you, thank you." I replied at once as her
eyelids closed, "Have a nice trip."2
INTRODUCTION
On June 4, 1990, a bizarre event in a trailer park in a suburb of Detroit,
Michigan, brought national attention to the issue of euthanasia. In the back of
a rusted Volkswagen van, retired pathologist Dr. Jack Kevorklan assisted
Janet Adkins to take her own life using a "suicide machine" he had invented.3
Adkins, a victim of Alzheimer's disease, had only to touch a hair-trigger
switch to begin the intravenous self-administration of a coma-inducing drug,
followed by a lethal dose of potassium chloride.4 While much of the medical
community condemned Kevorkian, public opinion supported Adkins's right to
control her own fate,5 and the incident helped move euthanasia from a fringe
belief to a mainstream concern.6 Since Adkins's death, a series of events has
kept the issue before the public,7 and if euthanasia advocates have their way,
* J.D. Candidate, 1993, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; M.F.A., Columbia
University, 1987; B.F.A., New York University, 1979. I wish to thank Professor Roger Dworkin for his
guidance and comments on drafts of this Note.
1. DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL ExiT 29 (1991).
2. JACK KEvORKIAN, PRESCRIPTION: MEDICIDE 230 (1991).
3. Lisa Belkin, Doctor Tells of First Death Using His Suicide Device, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1990,
at Al.
4. Id. at B6.
5. Tamar Lewin, Doctor Cleared of Murdenng Woman with Suicide Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
14, 1990, at B8.
6. Timothy Egan, Washington Voters Weigh IfThere Is a Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1991,
at Al.
7. In July, 1991, a grand jury in Rochester, New York, refused to indict a physician who admitted
helping a leukemia patient commit suicide. Lawrence K. Altman, Jury Declines to Indict a Doctor Who
Said He Aided in a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1991, at Al; see infra notes 77-83 and accompanying
text. In August, 1991, Final Exit, a do-it-yourself suicide manual by Hemlock Society founder Derek
Humphry reached The New York Times bestseller list, where it stayed for 18 weeks. Rest Sellers, N.Y.
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voluntary euthanasia will be legalized, irrevocably altering the way death
occurs in our society and the fundamental relationship of human beings to
death and dying.
Euthanasia proponents contend that allowing a patient to request medical
assistance in dying is "the ultimate extension of patients' rights."' Opponents
maintain that medicine should remain a profession dedicated to healing-"[i]ts
tools should not be used to kill people."9 Legal euthanasia represents a
momentous departure from medical tradition, and it presents a host of
problematic legal, moral, ethical, and medical issues.
The rapid advance of biotechnology over the past three decades has
revolutionized the process of dying, and many terminally ill patients and their
families have found themselves helplessly confronted with a death agonizingly
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1992, § 7 (Book Review) at 22. In September, 1991, the Dutch government released
the first comprehensive study of the practice of euthanasia in the Netherlands. Marlise Simons, Dutch
Survey Casts New Light on Patients Who Choose to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1991, at C12. In
October, 1991, Kevorkian assisted the suicides of Sherry Miller, 43, a victim of multiple sclerosis, and
Marjone Wantz, 58, who had papilloma virus; neither woman was terminally ill. Suicide Victims Were
Adamant, Lawyers Claim, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1991, at A17. In November, 1991, an "Initiative for
Death With Dignity" went before the voters in Washington State, who rejected the opportunity to make
Washington the first state in the union to allow doctors actively to end the life of a terminally ill patient
upon request. Egan, supra note 6. Designated "Initiative 119," the measure was put on the ballot after
233,000 signatures were gathered by a coalition of pro-euthanasia groups. Id. On May 15, 1992,
Kevorkian assisted the suicide of Susan Williams, 52, a multiple sclerosis victim. Al Koski, Dr. Death
Strikes Again, UPI, May 15, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire Service File. On July 21,
1992, Kevorkian was acquitted of the October 1991 suicides. Al Koski, Judge Frees 'Dr. Death' of
Murder Charges, UPI, July 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire Service File [hereinafter
Koska, Acquittal]. On September 26, 1992, Kevorkian assisted the suicide of Lois Hawes, 52, a cancer
victim. Robert Ourlian & Elizabeth Atkins, Supporters of 'Dr. Death'See New Era in Assisted Suicides,
Gannett News Service, Sept. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Service File. On
October 6, 1992, the Michigan House of Representatives Subcommittee on Death and Dying approved
a bill to allow physician-assisted suicide. Joyce Price, Michigan Committee Approves Assisted-Suicide
Bill, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1992, at A5. On November 3, 1992, California voters rejected Proposition
161, a measure to legalize voluntary active euthanasia in that state. George de Lama, States Take Pulse
on Morality, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 1992, § 1, at 7. On November 23, 1992, Kevorkian assisted the suicide
of Catherine Andreyev, 46, a breast cancer victim. Al Koski, Kevorkian Helps Sixth Woman Commit
Suicide, UPI, Nov. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire Service File. On December 15,
1992, Kevorkian assisted the suicides of Marguerite Tate, a 70-year-old victim of heart disease,
emphysema, and arthritis, and Marcella Lawrence, a 67-year-old victim of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis,
just hours before Michigan Governor John Engler signed legislation banning assisted suicide for two
years beginning March 30, 1993, while a commission studies the issue. Two More Suicides Before
Governor OKs Ban, CHI. TPiB., Dec. 16, 1992, § 1, at 6; see infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
In the weeks before the ban was to take effect, Kevorkian stepped up his pace, assisting the suicides of
four men and three women, ages ranging from 41 to 82. Tom Morganthau, Dr. Kevorkian 's Death Wish,
NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 1993, at 46. In response, the Michigan legislature moved the ban's effective date
up to February 25, 1993. Id.
8. Egan, supra note 6 (quoting Dr. Linda Gromko, a Seattle family physician and euthanasia
advocate).
9. Id. (quoting the American Medical Society's ethics committee).
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protracted through the intervention of life-sustaining medical devices. From
the New Jersey Supreme Court's Quinlan"° decision in 1976 through the
United States Supreme Court decision in Cruzani in 1990, the judicial
system has struggled to define the limits of patient autonomy 12 Most states
now recognize that patients have the right to refuse medical treatment,
including artificially supplied nutrition and hydration, either themselves, if
competent, or through the use of advance directives. 3 Opinion polls indicate
10. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
I1. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
12. Courts have defined the limits of patient autonomy by balancing self-determination interests
against state interests in the preservation of life. In In re Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that the federal constitutional right to privacy encompassed "a patient's decision to decline medical
treatment under certain circumstances " In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663. In Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that incompetent persons retain the same rights as competent persons "because the
value of human dignity extends to both," and balanced those rights against countervailing state interests.
Id. at 427. In the first federal case to confront these issues, Gray v. Romeo, 697 F Supp. 580 (D.R.I.
1988), the court distinguished suicide from self-determination, finding that suicide is "deliberately
ending a life by artificial means," while self-determination is "allowing nature to take its course." Id.
at 589 (citations omitted). In its 1990 Cruzan decision, the United States Supreme Court assumed, for
purposes of its decision, that "the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition." Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279.
Of the several cases dealing with the right of competent patients to refuse life-saving treatment, most
early cases involved Jehovah's Witnesses' refusal of blood transfusions. See Martha A. Matthews,
Comment, Suicidal Competence and the Patient's Right to Refuse Lifesaving Treatment, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 707, 716-18 (1987). Since 1973, however, competent patients have been permitted to refuse a
breast biopsy, In re Yetter, 41 Northampton County Rptr. 67, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973), refuse
amputation of a gangrenous limb, In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (Moms County Ct., N.J. 1978);
Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. Ct. App. 1978), refuse dialysis, In re Lydia E. Hall Hospital,
455 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Sup. Ct. 1982), and demand the removal of a respirator, Satz v. Perlmutter, 362
So.2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Two California cases, Bartling v. Superior Court (Glendale
Adventist Medical Center), 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), and Bouvia v. Superior Court
(Glenchar), 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), allowed the refusal of treatment by individuals who
were not considered terminally ill. In Bartling, the court held that competent patients have the right to
decide whether to submit to medical treatment, balancing that right against the state interests enunciated
in Saikevicz. Bartling, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 224. The Bouvia court, in deciding to allow a 28-year-old
quadriplegic woman with cerebral palsy and degenerative arthritis to compel the removal of a
nasogastric feeding tube, denied a state interest in preserving the life of an individual in Bouvia's
condition:
We do not believe it is the policy of this State that all and every life must be preserved
against the will of the sufferer. It is incongruous, if not monstrous, for medical
practitioners to assert their right to preserve a life that someone else must live, or, more
accurately, endure for "15 to 20 years."
Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
13. An advance directive is a document that allows an individual to specify the kind of care he or
she wishes to receive (or not to receive) in the event of incompetency. Advance directives generally take
two forms: living wills and durable powers of attorney. Living wills permit patients to request that
medical interventions that would prolong the dying process not be administered. PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIOR
RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 139 (1983). Durable power of attorney
1993]
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widespread support for extending patient autonomy to permit voluntary
euthanasia, 4 and while physicians' associations, including the American
Medical Association, oppose euthanasia, many doctors support the administra-
tion of euthanasia in exceptional circumstances. 15 In the Netherlands, despite
its statutory illegality, euthanasia was practiced routinely under judicial
guidelines for nearly twenty years, until the Dutch Parliament codified a set
of guidelines in February 1993, virtually immunizing physicians from
prosecution.!6 Many American physicians believe that active euthanasia is
already performed on a regular basis in hospitals throughout the United
States."
The spread of AIDS, the suffering of patients with advanced cancer, and the
desire of many Americans to wrest control of their medical destinies from the
health care establishment may be important factors in public support for legal
euthanasia. Moreover, euthanasia is emerging as a significant public policy
issue at a time when health care policy making is in turmoil. Issues of
resource allocation, the care of the medically indigent, and the care of the
terminally ill are facets of a health care crisis of dire proportions. The recent
surge of interest in euthanasia may also be symptomatic of many Americans'
lack of faith in our ability to solve the seemingly intractable dilemmas in our
health care system.
This Note examines the question of whether the law should accommodate
a mechanism by which physicians may actively end the life of a terminally ill
statutes permit individuals to appoint a surrogate to make health care decisions should the individual
become incompetent. Id. at 145. The Patient Self-Determination Act, which went into effect on
December 1, 1991, was intended to bring about greater awareness of advance directives. Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508 (1990), §§ 4206(a), 4751(a) (Patient Self-
Determination Act). Hospitals and nursing homes participating in Medicare or Medicaid are now
required to inform all adult patients of their rights under state law to make decisions concerning their
care, including the right to accept or refuse treatment. Id.
14. An April, 1990, Roper poll asked: "When a person has a painful and distressing terminal
disease, do you think doctors should or should not be allowed by law to end the patient's life if there
is no hope of recovery and the patient requests it?" The results: Yes, 64%; No, 24%; Don't know, 13%.
Don C. Shaw, Reflection, in ACTIVE EUTHANASIA, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC DEBATE 98 (Ron Hamel
ed., 1991) [hereinafter ACTIVE EUTHANASIA]. Polls taken in Washington State during the campaign for
Initiative 119 and in California during the campaign for Proposition 161 showed wide margins of
support for the measures until the last days before voting took place. Peter Steinfels, Beliefs, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 9, 1991, at 11; California: Proposition 166 on the Defensive, HEALTH LINE, Oct. 13, 1992.
The last-minute change of heart in both states may be attributed to the effective and ubiquitous anti-
euthanasia advertising campaigns by a coalition of Catholic and pro-life groups and medical associations.
de Lama, supra note 7; Egan, supra note 6.
15. Robert Moss, Reflection, in ACTIVE EUTHANASIA, supra note 14, at 95-97.
16. William Drozdiak, Dutch Remove Barrier to Doctors Carrying Out Euthanasia, WASH. POST,
Feb. 10, 1993, at A23. See infra notes 84-124 and accompanying text.
17. Richard A. Knox, Dutch Study Reports Euthanasia Practiced Widely but Cautiously, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 13, 1991, at 1; see also infra note 39 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 68:977
EUTHANASIA
patient through voluntary euthanasia. Much of the recent dialogue concerning
euthanasia has centered on whether euthanasia is ever morally justifiable."8
In this Note, I set aside the moral and ethical dimensions of the debate and
deal primarily with the likely consequences attending the various schemes for
legal voluntary euthanasia in our society and present health care system.
Part I of this Note surveys current arguments for and against the legaliza-
tion of euthanasia. Part II examines the way courts in the United States and
the Netherlands have dealt with voluntary euthanasia and analyzes proposals
for statutory reform. Part III presents an argument that the law should not
accommodate voluntary euthanasia until systemic problems in our health care
institutions are resolved and our management of death and dying is reformed.
I. BACKGROUND: THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE
To the ancient Greeks, the term eu thanatos meant "good or easy death," in
the sense of dying peacefully and with a psychologically balanced state of
mind.' 9 Today, euthanasia is commonly understood to refer to the intentional
medical inducement of death.
Arguments in favor of legal euthanasia stress autonomy and mercy as values
served by voluntary euthanasia. The autonomy argument holds that a patient's
power to request that a physician end his life is the ultimate extension of self-
determination, based on the established right of privacy and right to refuse
treatment.2" Tht mercy argument holds that if a terminal patient prefers
18. For a detailed analysis of the moral aspects of euthanasia from a pro-euthanasia point of view,
see JAMES RAcHELS, THE END OF LIFE (1986). The opposing moral arguments are well expressed in
Arthur J. Dyck, An Alternative to the Ethic of Euthanasia, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN DEATH AND DYING
281 (Robert F Weir ed., 1977).
19. Edwin R. DuBose, A Brief Historical Perspective, in ACTIVE EUTHANASIA, supra note 14, at
18.
20. See supra note 12. See generally Steven J. Wolhandler, Note, Voluntary Active Euthanasia for
the Terminally Il and the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 363 (1984); Note,
Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2021 (1992). The
concept of patient autonomy, when framed in terms of rights, is ultimately unhelpful in formulating
euthanasia policy. Even fundamental libertarianism derived from John Stuart Mill and the contractual
libertarian theory of Hobbes and Locke recognize that government may interfere in the sphere of private
action when societal interests are implicated. See generally John S. Mill, On Liberty, in PREFACES TO
LIBERTY: SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN STUART MILL 239 (Bernard Wishy ed., 1959) (1859); THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Cambridge Unv. Press 1991) (1651); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) (1698). Suicide, assisted suicide, and voluntary
euthanasia are activities which may be described on a continuum of autonomy: suicide is a solitary, self-
referential act; assisted suicide requires advice or assistance with the act; voluntary euthanasia needs the
completion of the act by another. Suicide is more likely than are assisted suicide and voluntary
euthanasia to satisfy libertarian criteria for a liberty which deserves no interference, but, as Mill asserts,
"No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or
1993]
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death to lingering on in torment, it is not immoral to help the patient die
sooner.2' At the same time, the values of autonomy and mercy can each be
extrapolated to situations which do not involve the other. Autonomy may be
extended to allow euthanasia where the patient is not in pain but wishes to die
for other reasons: a deterioration in quality of life, the loss of dignity, or the
wish not to burden his family financially with a prolonged hospital or nursing
home stay The value of mercy may be extended to allow euthanasia for
patients who are incompetent to make informed decisions regarding their
care-such as Alzheimer's patients, the senile, children, or the retarded-yet
who suffer intense and intractable pain. Proposed euthanasia legislation is
generally intended to permit the narrow range of cases embodying both the
expression of autonomy and the merciful alleviation of suffering.2
Arguments against legalization of euthanasia comprise three major themes:
the sanctity of human life, the slippery slope, and the danger of abuse. 3 The
sanctity of life argument emphasizes the inviolability of our cultural
prohibition against killing.24 Slippery slope arguments envision the legaliza-
tion of voluntary euthanasia as inexorably leading to forms of involuntary
euthanasia and an attendant devaluation of human life.25 Danger of abuse
arguments envision the coercion of patients by their families, doctors, or
health care workers to request euthanasia, and the disregard of euthanasia
guidelines by physicians and institutions.26 The arguments presented in Part
III of this Note fall roughly into this last category, examining the potential
effects of allowing the practice of euthanasia in our health care system.
permanently hurtful to himself without mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often far
beyond them." Mill, supra, at 326.
21. RACHELS, supra note 18, at 154. Rachels develops the mercy argument using utilitarian
principles: "Any action is morally right if it serves to increase the amount of happiness in the world or
to decrease the amount of misery." Id.
22. See infra notes 125-73 and accompanying text.
23. See Tom L. Beauchamp & Seymour Perlin, Euthanasia and Natural Death, in ETHICAL ISSUES
IN DEATH AND DYING 217-18 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Seymour Perlin eds., 1978) [hereinafter ETHICAL
ISSUES].
24. See C. Everett Koop, The Challenge of Definition, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. (Special Supp.),
Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 2.
25. Yale Kamisar and Glanville Williams debated "slippery slope" and "wedge" (Williams's term)
arguments on euthanasia in an exchange of articles in the late 1950s. Kamisar wrote an article, Yale
Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against "Mercy Killing" Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969 (1958)
[hereinafter Kamisar, Non-Religious Views], in response to Williams's book The Sanctity of Life and
the Criminal Law. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1957).
Williams replied with an article of his own. Glanville Williams, "Mercy Killing" Legislation-A
Rejoinder to the Non-Religious Objections, 43 MINN. L. REV. 134 (1959). In 1991, Kamisar revisited
the debate. Yale Kamisar, When Is There a Constitutional "Right to Die"? When Is There No
Constitutional "Right to Live"?, 25 GA. L. REV. 1203 (1991) [hereinafter Kamisar, Right to Die?].
26. Beauchamp & Perlin, supra note 23, at 218.
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At the core of the euthanasia debate, however, is the distinction between
active and passive euthanasia, that is, between "killing" and "letting die."27
Active euthanasia is the administration of any means intended to produce
death, such as the deliberate injection of a lethal dose of morphine. Passive
euthanasia is the withdrawal of life-sustaining care, such as artificially
supplied nutrition and hydration or a respirator.
Passive euthanasia has been legally sanctioned since In re Quinlan,28 in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court permitted a respirator to be removed in
order to allow an incompetent patient to die. No statutory change was
necessary to immunize physicians from legal responsibility for withdrawal of
treatment.2 9 Legalizing active euthanasia, on the other hand, is likely to
necessitate a statutory change because the act of killing a patient, regardless
of the circumstances, is currently considered murder.3" Even if a physician
were merely to supply a patient with lethal drugs for the patient's self-
administration, as Dr. Kevorkian did, the physician would, in most states, be
violating laws against assisted suicide.31
27. Six identifiable major forms of euthanasia were delineated from a medical perspective by Dr.
George Lundberg, editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association: (1) passive, where a
physician may choose not to treat a life-threatening condition in a noncomatose patient; (2) semipassive,
where a physician may withhold medical treatment, such as nutrition or fluids, from a person in a coma;
(3) senactive, where a physician may disconnect a ventilator from a patient who is in a stable,
vegetative state and has no hope of regaining consciousness; (4) accidental ("double effect'), where a
physician may administer a narcotic to relieve pain and the narcotic may incidentally depress respiration
sufficiently to cause death; (5) suicidal, where a physician may provide a patient with lethal drugs which
the patient may choose to take; and (6) active, where a physician may administer a lethal overdose of
morphine or potassium in a patient with, for example, advanced AIDS. George D. Lundberg, 'It's Over,
Debbie' and the Euthanasia Debate, 259 JAMA 2142, 2143 (1988).
28. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
29. In 1983, two California doctors were convicted of murder and conspiracy to commit murder for
removing a respirator and withdrawing artificially supplied nutrition and hydration from a comatose
patient at the family's request. Barber v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 486-87 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983). On appeal, the court ruled for the first time that nutrition and hydration constituted a medical
procedure, and stated that physicians are under no duty to continue treatment when there is no hope of
recovery. Id. at 493.
30. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. It is possible, however, that if a constitutional
"right to die" is established for patients, homicide statutes could not be constitutionally applied to
physicians who kill patients in furtherance of that right. A case has yet to be reported in which a
physician uses a constitutional argument as a defense to homicide (or assisting a suicide) in voluntary
euthanasia.
31. Currently, 31 states and Puerto Rico have statutes crimnalizing assisted suicide: Alaska,
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(2) (1989); Arizona, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(3) (1989);
Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (Michie 1987); California, CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West
1988); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (1978); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-56(a)(2) (West 1985); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1987); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 782.08 (West 1992); Hawaii, HAWAii REV. STAT. § 707-702(1)(b) (1985); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 12-31 (Smith-Hurd 1992); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-2 (Bums 1985); Kansas,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1988); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 201, 204 (1983);
1993]
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Euthanasia proponents assert that the distinction between active and passive
euthanasia is arbitrary and morally irrelevant.3 2 Opponents uphold the
active/passive distinction as the most appropriate place to draw the line on
how far society can safely go in allowing any form of euthanasia.3 Efforts
to legalize active voluntary euthanasia have relied on the premise that the
active/passive distinction is irrelevant-in other words, since the lethal
injection or the withdrawal of treatment both result in the patient's death, the
lethal injection should also be allowed.34 The active/passive distinction is
closely related to the categorical differences of acts of commission and
omission, of withholding and withdrawing treatment, and of the direct and
indirect causation of death.3 5 Perhaps the strongest argument for its
maintenance is that it preserves the historical role of physicians as healers and
comforters, not as agents of death.3 6 The fact remains that the active/passive
distinction is the prevailing legal boundary which physicians must observe
with respect to their patients' right to die.
II. EUTHANASIA AND THE LAW
Euthanasia has been addressed in courts and legislatures in the United States
sporadically during the twentieth century Its treatment suggests public
Michigan, Act of Dec. 15, 1992, 1992 Mich. Pub. Acts 270 (creating Michigan commission on death
and dying and prohibiting certain acts pertaining to suicide assistance); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.215 (West 1987); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1973); Missoun, Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.023 (1992); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1991); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
307 (1989); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1986); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C: 11-6 (West 1982); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie 1984); New York, N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1987); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04 (1991); Oklahoma,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 813-818 (West 1983); Oregon, OR. REv. STAT. § 163.125(i)(b) (1990);
Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 (1983); Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4009
(1984); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-37 (1988); Texas, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.08 (West 1989); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988); and Wisconsin,
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982).
32. RACHELS, supra note 18, at 108. James Rachels, Glanville Williams, and Joseph Fletcher,
among others, have argued against the active/passive distinction. See id., WILLIAMS, supra note 25;
JOSEPH FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE (1954).
33. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 146-47 (3d
ed. 1989). Yale Kamisar, Tom Beauchamp, and Daniel Maguire have argued in favor of maintaining
the distinction. See generally DANIEL MAGUIRE, DEATH BY CHOICE 97-103 (1987); Tom L. Beauchamp,
A Reply to Rachels on Active and Passive Euthanasia, in ETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 23, at 246;
Kamisar, Non-Religious Views, supra note 25; Kamisar, Right to Die?, supra note 25.
34. James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, in ETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 23, at 245.
35. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 33, at 134-47.
36. Daniel Callahan, Can We Return Death to Disease?, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. (Special
Supp.), Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 4, 6.
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sympathy for the principle of euthanasia andjudicial and legislative reluctance
to grant euthanasia the protection of the law In court cases of mercy killings
or assisted suicides by physicians, courts have generally either acquitted or
failed to indict the physician, 37 but no precedent has been set explicitly
granting judicial approbation to either euthanasia or assisted suicide.
In the Netherlands, euthanasia has held a unique quasi-legal status for
nearly two decades. Despite its statutory illegality, courts have, in a series of
mercy killing acquittals, promulgated guidelines for physicians in the practice
of euthanasia. The result has been its de facto legalization.
Section A of this Part surveys euthanasia in the courts, beginning with
instances of physicians charged with mercy killing in the United States. This
section then examines the development of guidelines governing the practice
of euthanasia in the Netherlands and discusses arguments against adoption of
an analogous system in the United States. Section B of Part II analyzes
several statutory proposals for the legalization of euthanasia that have been
made in the United States and Great Britain since 1906.
A. Judicial Responses to Euthanasia
1. The United States
Active euthanasia is illegal in the United States. Physicians who cause the
death of a patient or assist in a patient's suicide may be prosecuted under
homicide statutes, which exist in every state, or laws prohibiting assistance
to suicide, which currently exist in thirty-one states.35 Despite the reputed
practice of active euthanasia by physicians, 39 few indictments have been
returned, and very few cases have been brought to trial. The greatest number
of mercy killing cases have involved the killing of a spouse, parent, or child
37. Two exceptions are Dr. Joseph Hassman of New Jersey and Dr. Donald Caraccio of Michigan.
See infra note 41.
38. See supra note 31.
39. Some commentators believe the frequency of euthanasia in the U.S. to be fairly close to that
of the Netherlands (about three percent of all deaths), though the practice is much more covert here.
Knox, supra note 17. Dr. Jan van Eys of the University of Texas Medical Center, a Dutch native who




by a nonphysician, 0 and, until recently, most have occurred without the
consent of the victim.4'
The first widely publicized mercy killing case involving a physician took
place in New Hampshire in 1949 Dr. Herman Sander, a general practitioner,
injected air into the vein of a comatose cancer patient who was on the verge
of death. Dr. Sander dictated a description of his actions into the hospital
record, and was arrested two weeks later when the hospital's records librarian
reported the incident to her superiors. After an outpouring of support from the
general public (and condemnation from religious groups),4 a jury trial was
held and Dr. Sander was acquitted.43
In 1973, Dr. Vincent Montemarano, chief surgical resident at the Nassau
County Medical Center in New York, was indicted for murder after giving a
fifty-seven-year-old throat cancer victim a fatal injection of potassium
chloride.44 The victim, who had only days to live, died within five minutes
of the injection. After deliberating for fifty-five minutes, the jury returned a
not guilty verdict.45
40. In 1938, a Nassau County, New York, grand jury refused to indict Harry C. Johnson, who had
asphyxiated his cancer-stricken wife. Kamisar, Non-Religious Views, supra note 25, at 971 n. 11. In
1950, Carol Ann Paight was acquitted on grounds of temporary insanity in the shooting death of her
father, who had just been diagnosed with cancer. Id. at 1020 & n.173. In 1939, Louis Greenfield was
acquitted in New York of chloroforming his son, an "incurable imbecile," to death. Id. at 1021 n.180.
The Greenfield case inspired Louis Repouille, a resident alien, to administer chloroform to his own
imbecilic son, who was blind and bedridden since infancy. Repouille was found guilty of manslaughter
and freed on a suspended sentence, but years later was denied naturalization because he had not
exhibited "good moral character." The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a now famous opinion by
Judge Learned Hand, held that "only a minority of virtuous persons would deem the practice morally
justifiable, while it remains in private hands, even when the provocation is as overwhelming as it was
in this instance." Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1947).
41. Of the eleven physicians who have been charged in connection with the killing of a patient or
an ill or incapacitated member of the physician's family, none has been imprisoned. In Colorado in
1935, Dr. Harold Blazer killed his daughter, a victim of cerebral spinal meningitis, using chloroform,
and was acquitted at trial. In New York in 1985, Dr. John Kraai killed a friend and patient who suffered
from Alzheimer's disease and gangrene of the foot; Dr. Kraai subsequently killed himself three weeks
after his arrest. In 1986 in New Jersey, Dr. Joseph Hassman injected his mother-in-law, an Alzheimer's
victim, with a lethal dose of Demerol; he was found guilty and sentenced to two years' probation, fined
$10,000, and ordered to perform 400 hours of community service. In 1987 in Ft. Myers, Florida, Dr.
Peter Rosier was acquitted after a botched attempt at ending the life of his cancer-stricken wife (the
mercy killing was successfully completed by the wife's stepfather). In Michigan in 1989, Dr. Donald
Caraccio pleaded guilty to the murder, by lethal injection, of a comatose 74-year-old woman; he
received five years probation with community service. DEREK HUMPHRY, EUTHANASIA 129-35 (1991).
42. 0. RUTH RUSSELL, FREEDOM TO DIE 104-06 (rev. ed. 1977).
43. At trial, the defendant asserted that the patient was already dead when he injected the air. It was
also revealed that the patient's family was split over the doctor's actions. The husband and one brother
sided with the doctor; another brother felt the patient's fate belonged to "the will of God." Kamisar,
Non-Religious Views, supra note 25, at n.172 (quoting 40 cc of Air, TIME, Jan. 9, 1950, at 13).
44. RUSSELL, supra note 42, at 197.
45. HUMPHRY, supra note 41, at 130.
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The June, 1990, suicide of Janet Adkins generated worldwide interest as the
first use of the notorious "suicide machine" invented by longtime euthanasia
advocate Dr. Jack Kevorkian. 4 Kevorkian, who had publicized his device
(dubbed the "Mercitron") in the national media since 1989, was contacted by
Adkins, who asked his help in ending her life. Adkins, who was fifty-four,
said that she had made her decision to die nearly a year earlier, when she was
first diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease.47 At the time of her death, the
disease had progressed to the point where Adkins had begun to lose her
memory and could no longer play the piano and flute, but she was well
enough to play tennis with her son and to enjoy a last romantic weekend with
her husband.
Dr. Kevorkian's suicide machine was a sophisticated extrapolation on the
concept of a physician leaving a lethal dose of medication by a patient's
bedside. It consisted of an intravenous tube connected to three bottles, one
containing harmless saline solution, one containing thiopental, and one
containing potassium chloride. After Kevorkian inserted the intravenous tube
into Adkins's arm and began the saline solution, she pressed a button which
switched the line to the thiopental, which caused her to lose consciousness.
A minute later, a timing device switched the line to the potassium chloride,
which stopped her heart and caused death within minutes.49 By activating the
fatal device, Adkins had, in effect, taken her own life.
Kevorkian's device was designed to take advantage of the then-existing gap
in Michigan law regarding assisted suicide, which had been uncertain since
the 1984 Michigan Supreme Court refused to consider an appeal from the
Michigan court of appeals in People v. Campbell." In that case, the
defendant, who was charged with murder in a suicide death, appealed from the
denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground that providing a weapon to an
individual who subsequently uses it to commit suicide does not constitute
46. Belkin, supra note 3. Kevorkian, 67, has been considered "something of an eccentric" since his
days as a resident at the hospital at the University of Michigan, where he was forced to leave when
officials heard of his proposal to make death row prisoners permanently unconscious for medical
experimentation. Isabel Wilkerson, Physician Fulfills a Goal: Aiding a Person in Suicide, N.Y. TIMES,
June 7, 1990, at D22. A self-described "outcast," Kevorkian claims not to have held a job since 1982
because his "renegade ideas" have frightened hospitals from hiring hlm--"I don't apply anymore." he
said. Id. Derek Humphry has called Kevorkian "the loose cannon of the euthanasia movement." Jane
Gross, Voters Turn Down Mercy Killing Idea, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at Bi6.
47. Belkin, supra note 3.
48. Albert W. Alschuler, Reflection, in ACTIVE EUTHANASIA, supra note 14, at 107.
49. Belkin, supra note 3.
50. 342 N.W.2d 519 (Mich. 1984), appeal denied from 335 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
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murder.51 The court of appeals agreed, reversing the trial court, and stated
that "[w]hile we find the conduct of the defendant morally reprehensible, we
do not find it to be criminal under the present state of the law "52 In doing
so, the court rejected the prosecution's reliance on a 1920 case, People v.
Roberts,3 in which the defendant had placed a potion of paris green, a
highly poisonous pigment containing arsenic trioxide, within the reach of his
wife, who had terminal multiple sclerosis and who had requested her husband
to help her die. Roberts was charged and convicted of first degree murder.
The Roberts court treated issues of homicide only, and did not discuss the
incident as a suicide. 4 In contrast, the Campbell court held, "the term
suicide excludes by definition a homicide. Simply put, the defendant here did
not kill another person."55 The court further explicitly invited the legislature
to adopt legislation regarding assisted suicide. 6
Nearly six months after Janet Adkins's death, Kevorkian was arrested and
charged with first degree murder."' The prosecutor cited Roberts, which was
never explicitly overturned, and called Kevorkian "the legal and primary
cause" of Adkins's death, asserting that Kevorkian could not "avoid
culpability by the clever use of a switch.""8 Kevorkian's attorneys invoked
Campbell.59 Ten days later, after a two day preliminary hearing, Judge
Gerald McNulty of the Oakland County District Court dismissed the murder
51. Steven Paul Campbell was charged in the October 4, 1980, suicide of Kevin Patrick Basnaw.
According to testimony, two weeks earlier Campbell had caught Basnaw in bed with Campbell's wife.
On the night of the suicide, Campbell and Basnaw were drinking heavily at Basnaw's home. Late in
the evening Basnaw began talking about committing suicide, and said he did not have a gun. At first,
Campbell refused to allow Basnaw to borrow or buy one of his guns, but later changed his mind and
drove with Basnaw to Campbell's parents' home to get a gun. They returned to Basnaw's home with
a gun and five shells, and Basnaw told his girlfriend to leave with Campbell because he was going to
kill himself. Basnaw put the shells and the gun on the kitchen table and began to write a suicide note.
Campbell and Basnaw's girlfriend left at approximately 3:00 a.m. The next morning, Basnaw was found
dead at the kitchen table with the gun in his hand. People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 28-29 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1983).
52. Id. at 31.
53. 178 N.W 690 (Mich. 1920).
54. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d at 29.
55. Id. at 30.
56. Id. at 31. The Michigan legislature has since taken action on both sides of the issue. In October,
1992, the Michigan House of Representatives Subcommittee on Death and Dying approved a bill to
permit physician-assisted suicide and sent it to the House Judiciary Committee for debate. Price, supra
note 7; see infra notes 161-70 and accompanying text. On December 15, 1992, an anti-euthanasia bill
was signed into law by Michigan Governor John Engler. Two More Assisted Suicides Before Governor
OKs Ban, supra note 7; see infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
57. Isabel Wilkerson, Inventor of Suicide Machine Arrested on Murder Charge, N.Y. TiMES, Dec.





charges, finding no probable cause that Kevorkian had committed murder.60
Stating that it was Mrs. Adkins, not Kevorkian, who had caused her death, he
called upon the state legislature to address the issue of assisted suicide.6
On October 23, 1991, nearly seventeen months after Adkins's death,
Kevorkian assisted two other women to commit suicide in Michigan.62 One
was a forty-three-year-old victim of multiple sclerosis; the other woman, fifty-
eight, suffered from papilloma virus, a painful pelvic condition.63 Neither
woman was in danger of imminent death. 64 Kevorkian used a newly designed
version of his suicide machine in one death; the other was accomplished using
a carbon monoxide tank and mask.65 On November 20, 1991, the Michigan
Medical Association suspended Kevorkian's license to practice medicine in
that state.66 On January 6, 1992, an Oakland County grand jury opened an
investigation into Kevorkian's role in the suicides; an indictment was returned
and on February 21, 1992, Kevorkian was ordered to stand trial for murder.
While awaiting trial, on May 15, 1992, Kevorkian assisted the suicide of
Susan Williams, a fifty-two-year-old victim of multiple sclerosis. 67 Prosecu-
tors had not yet filed charges in that case when, on July 21, 1992, Oakland
County Circuit Judge David Breck dismissed the charges in the October, 1991,
60. Tamar Lewin, Doctor Cleared of Murderng Woman with Suicide Machine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
14, 1990, at B6.
61. Id. Although charges were dropped against Kevorkian, he remained barred by judicial order
issued four days after Adkins's death from using his suicide device again. Id. Two months after
Adkins's suicide, Bertram and Virginia Harper and their daughter flew to Michigan from California,
where assisted suicide is a felony, to exploit the legal vacuum Kevorkian had publicized. In a suburban
Detroit motel room, Virginia Harper, who suffered from liver cancer, took an overdose of sleeping pills
and fastened a plastic bag over her head. After Virginia became unconscious, Bertram fastened the bag
more securely around her neck, this fact was seized upon by prosecutors who hoped to show that
Bertram caused her death. Bertram Harper was charged with first degree murder, but a jury acquitted
him nine months later, finding that the sedatives taken by Virginia's own hand were the primary cause
of death. Man Who Helped Wife Commit Suicide is Acquitted of Murder, CHI. TRIB., May I1, 1991, at
C2.
62. Doctor Assists in Two More Suicides in Michigan, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 24, 1991, at Al.
63. Id.
64. Suicide Victims Were Adamant, Lawyers Claim, supra note 7.
65. Doctor Assists in Two More Suicides in Michigan, supra note 62. Carbon monoxide gas became
Kevorkian's exclusive method after his medical license was suspended and it was no longer possible
for him to obtain potassium chloride. David Margolick, Doctor Who Helps Suicides Has Made the
Bizarre Banal, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 22, 1993, at Ai. To begin the flow of gas, the individual tugs a string
attached to a clip on the plastic tube running from the carbon monoxide canister to the mask. Death
occurs within minutes. Id.
66. In Wake of 3 Suicides, Dr. Kevorkian Loses Michigan License, CriI. TRIB., Nov. 21, 1991, at
C16.
67. Kevorkian Provided the Gas for Woman's Suicide, N.Y. TiMEs, May 17, 1992, at A21.
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suicides, explicitly rejecting Roberts68 and holding that "because physician-
assisted suicide is not a crime, defendant was wrongly bound over.
69
On September 26, 1992, Kevorkian assisted the suicide of Lois Hawes, a
fifty-two-year-old cancer victim, again employing carbon monoxide. 70
Chastened by the two previous dismissals, Oakland County prosecutor Richard
Thompson said that he would not prosecute again without action by the
legislature or appellate courts.7
On November 24, 1992, the Michigan House of Representatives acted,
passing a provisional anti-euthanasia measure that outlawed assisted suicide
for two years beginning March 30, 1993, while a newly created commission
on death and dying studies the problem and develops recommendations for
legislation. 72 The measure, which makes assisted suicide a felony punishable
by up to four years imprisonment and a $2,000 fine, was quickly passed by
the Senate, then signed by Michigan's governor on December 15, 1992, a day
on which Kevorkian aided two additional suicides.73
During the next two months, Kevorkian aided the suicides of seven other
individuals, prompting the Michigan legislature to move the effective date of
the ban to February 25, 1993."4 On March 1, 1993, the American Civil
Liberties Union of Michigan filed suit on behalf of two terminally ill cancer
patients and seven local doctors, challenging the law as an unconstitutional
violation of the right to privacy and asking for a preliminary injunction to
stop enforcement of the law 75 Kevorkian, who is not a party to the suit, said
68. People v. Roberts, 178 N.W 690 (1920); see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
69. Koski, Acquittal, supra note 7.
70. Ourlian & Atkins, supra note 7.
71. Id.
72. Act of Dec. 15, 1992, 1992 Mich. Pub. Acts 270 (creating Michigan commission on death and
dying and prohibiting certain acts pertaining to suicide assistance).
73. Michael Abramowitz, Kevorkian Aids in 2 More Suicides; Michigan Governor Signs Bill
Making Practice a Felony, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1992, at A2; see supra note 7.
74. Act of Feb. 25, 1993, 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 3 (amending 1992 Mich. Pub. Acts 270 to take
effect Feb. 25, 1993).
75. Carol J. Castaneda, Aided-Suicide Ban Faces Challenge, USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 1993, at 6A.
According to attorney and law professor Robert Sedler, who is litigating the case for the American Civil
Liberties Union of Michigan, the ACLU's challenge relies on due process liberty interests of the kind
protected in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), and the line of reproductive rights
cases articulating the constitutional right to privacy. Telephone interview with the author, Mar. 9, 1993.
Sedler emphasized that the suit "has nothing to do with euthanasia" and is not intended to free
Kevorkian's hand; rather, the challenge has been brought to preserve the privacy of the doctor-patient
relationship, including the freedom of doctors to prescribe barbiturates and other pain-killing drugs
which may have the effect of hastening death and to instruct patients on the proper dosage if a lethal
effect is desired. Id.
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that he would not assist any additional suicides until a decision is rendered in
the preliminary injunction hearing.76
Another physician, Dr. Timothy Quill, attracted the attention of prosecutors
when he published an article in the New England Journal of Medicine in
March, 1991, describing his role in enabling a forty-five-year-old leukemia
victim to end her life." Dr. Quill, a professor at the University of Rochester
Medical School, had been the patient's physician for many years.78 He
supported her adamant decision to forego chemotherapy and prescribed, at her
request, enough barbiturates to kill her. The patient did not use the barbitu-
rates until several months later, when her condition had deteriorated
considerably Dr. Quill was not present at her suicide.79 Nonetheless,
prosecutors in Rochester, New York, where the incident took place, searched
death records to find a case which matched the one described in Quill's
article. 80 The victim was identified and her body found at a local college,
where it was being used as an instructional cadaver.8 The prosecutors
requested an indictment under the New York statute criminalizing assisting
suicide, 2 but after three days of hearings a grand jury failed to indict him.
Following that decision, both the New York State Medical Society and the
New York State Health Department declined to initiate disciplinary proceed-
ings. 3
Physician involvement in patient suicide remains an offense in most states,
though the degree to which prosecutors, juries, and courts will tolerate the
practice depends on the circumstances of the suicide. The willingness of
prosecutors to enforce assisted suicide statutes may face further tests if more
physicians come forward with tales of euthanasia and assisted suicide. Public
sympathy for physicians who aid their terminally ill patients in dying would
also be tested. While it is likely that Dr. Kevorkian could have been
76. Castaneda, supra note 75.
77. Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991). Dr. Quill decided
to write his article after reading an anonymous account of a mercy killing by a physician published in
1988 in the Journal of the Amencan Medical Association (JAMA). Robert Stembrook, Support Growsfor Euthanasia, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1991, at Al. The article, It's Over, Debbie, described the
administration of a lethal injection of morphine to a dying, pain-racked cancer patient whom the doctor
had never before met. Name Withheld By Request, It's Over, Debbie, 259 JAMA 272 (1988). The
article sparked heated debate, and letters to JAMA from physicians ran four to one against the mercy
killing. Lundberg, supra note 27, at 2142.
78. Altman, supra note 7.
79. Quill, supra note 77, at 693.
80. Altman, supra note 7.
81. Id.
82. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1987) ("A person is guilty of promoting a suicide
attempt when he intentionally causes or aids another person to attempt suicide.").
83. Altman, supra note 7.
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successfully prosecuted under New York's statute, the circumstances under
which Dr. Quill enabled his patient to die are likely to be tolerated in most
parts of the country
2. The Netherlands
Active voluntary euthanasia has been practiced openly in the Netherlands
since 1973,"4 when, for the first time, a Dutch physician was charged with
participating in a mercy killing under Article 293 of the Netherlands Penal
Code."5 In that case, which was heard by the lower court in Leeuwarden, the
physician acceded to repeated requests for death by her seventy-eight-year-old
mother, who was wheelchair-bound, incontinent, and partially deaf. 6 The
physician was found guilty and given a suspended sentence, but the court set
forth four conditions under which euthanasia would be acceptable: (1) the
patient's condition is incurable; (2) the patient's suffering is unbearable; (3)
the patient requests euthanasia in writing; and (4) a physician performs the
euthanasia. 7 Also in 1973, the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG)
issued a statement asserting that circumstances exist under which euthanasia
is justifiable, but that it should remain illegal."t
The Leeuwarden decision and the KNMG statement set the stage for a series
of court decisions during the 1970s and early 1980s which developed the
existing guidelines into three necessary conditions for the acceptable practice
84. The judicial decisions which led to the decriminalization of euthanasia in the Netherlands must
be viewed in the context of the Dutch civil law system, which differs from the United States' common
law system in several crucial respects. Judges in the Netherlands are appointed for life by the Queen,
and their independence is constitutionally guaranteed. There is no form of trial byjury. The judge's task
is to interpret the law and apply it to the case before him. There is no precedent law, except for the
rulings of the Supreme Court, which does not have the power of judicial review of the other branches
of government-Crown and Parliament. The rigidity of the system, as regards criminal law, is
compensated for by placing discretion in the Public Prosecutor's Office, which may drop criminal cases
if doing so serves the public interest. Euthanasia cases, because of their controversial nature, are given
special treatment and may be referred to the Minister of Justice. The Public Prosecutor's Office also has
the discretion to involve the Office of Medical Inspectors, which controls the quality of health care, so
as to insulate euthanasia cases whenever possible from the criminal law. Eugene Sutonus, How
Euthanasia Was Legalized in Holland, Address at Hemlock Society Convention 9-I1 (Feb. 9, 1985)
(transcript on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
85. Article 293, enacted in 1886, states: "He who robs another of life at his express and serious
wish is punished with a prison sentence of at most twelve years or a fine of the fifth category." CARLOS
F GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH 19 (1991). A fine of the fifth category may reach 100,000 guilders
(approximately $50,000 at 1991 exchange rates). Id. at 147 n.l. Article 294 provides criminal sanctions
for incitement or assistance to suicide, including a prison term of up to three years and a fine. Id. at 19.
86. Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1973:183; see GoMEz, supra note 85, at 28.
87. Id. at 30.
88. M.A.M. de Wachter, Active Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 262 JAMA 3316, 3317 (1989).
[Vol. 68:977
EUTHANASIA
of active euthanasia: (1) the patient must request euthanasia freely, without
solicitation or family pressure; (2) the patient must experience his condition
as unbearable; and (3) the physician must consult a colleague to confirm the
prognosis and diagnosis, to verify the medical performance of euthanasia, and
to ensure all legal requirements are met. 9 Courts generally applied these
standards, though judges were free to apply, and did apply, other standards,
including "the presence of an incurable disease" or that "unnecessary
suffering" not be inflicted on others.9" In 1981, however, the boundaries of
toleration of euthanasia were unsettled when the Rotterdam district court
convicted a nonphysician of assisting in a suicide, and in the process
promulgated a new set of euthanasia guidelines.9' The variation in criteria
signalled physicians that although Article 293 would not be strictly interpret-
ed, there was no assurance that they would not be prosecuted. 9 If unfortu-
nate enough to encounter a zealous prosecutor or unsympathetic judge, a
physician could be charged and convicted of a felony under Article 293.93
The Supreme Court of the Netherlands clarified much of the ambiguity in
its 1984 ruling on the euthanasia conviction of a physician from Purmerand,
Dr. Schoonheim. 94 In 1976, at age eighty-nine, Maria Barendregt, a "vital,
mentally strong person,"9' was forced by infirmities to move into a "living-
center," where she came under the care of Dr. Schoonheim. In 1980, she
signed a euthanasia declaration, and in 1981, after fracturing her hip in a fall,
declared that she would not submit to an operation unless assured that she
would not live through it. Dr. Schoonheim declined to operate, and over the
following months, Maria became bedridden, catheterized, and totally
dependent on the nursing staff. Her requests to be helped to die increased in
urgency until, in the last week of her life, she could no longer speak or drink.
After a few days, there was a slight remission, and she was able to speak, at
which time Maria begged her son to ensure that she receive euthanasia. She
repeated her request to Dr. Schoonheim, who ultimately agreed. Later that
week, after saying goodbye to her son and daughter-in-law, Maria again
confirmed her wish to die: "If it can be done please do it at once doctor;
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. GOMEz, supra note 85, at 32-33.
92. Id. at 34.
93. Id.
94. Nederlandse Junsprudentie 1984:106.
95. Sutonus, supra note 84, at 3.
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quickly, not one night more."96 Dr. Schoonheim then gave Maria three
injections to end her life.97
After Dr. Schoonheim obeyed the law by reporting his actions to the
municipal medical examiner and the police, he was charged under Article 293
and brought to trial. His defense was that a conflict of loyalties-to the law
and to his patient-had caused him to act under force majeure.9" He said he
had weighed the "conflicting duties and interests" of the case and acted in
accordance with professional standards of medical ethics.99
The court acquitted Schoonheim, finding that no crime had been committed.
The prosecutor appealed to the Amsterdam Court of Appeals, which reversed
the district court on the grounds that Article 293 had clearly been violated.
The court of appeals further asserted that the physician had not proved
"unbearable suffering" on the patient's part and therefore could not demon-
strate that the patient's suffering had left him no reasonable alternative.'
The Netherlands Supreme Court, in what became a landmark decision,
reversed the Amsterdam Court of Appeals. The Court agreed that Article 293
had been violated, but criticized the appellate court for not investigating
further into the specific circumstances under which the physician had acted.
Was the patient's suffering (mental or physical) expected to worsen? Was it
foreseeable that the patient would no longer be able to live in a dignified
way9 Were there still alternative ways to alleviate the patient's suffering?"'
Because the Supreme Court could only consider questions of law, it referred
the case to the Court of Appeals of the Hague, and instructed that court to
consider whether euthanasia, as practiced in this case, would be justified by
force majeure from a medical perspective.'
The Court of Appeals of the Hague fulfilled its mandate by requesting that
the KNMG present an opinion. The KNMG's response was to affirm that there
were situations of necessity in medicine in which physicians and patients
might be under such duress that euthanasia would be justifiable. Therefore,
the legality of euthanasia need not be questioned; the defense of necessity, for
96. Id. at 5.
97. Id.
98. The defense of force majeure has become standard in Dutch euthanasia cases, and stands for
the idea that the patient's extreme and enduring pain forces the physician to do something outside.
normal practice. The concept of force majeure has historically been used to excuse defendants who
broke the law under coercion. GOMEZ, supra note 85, at 150 n.26 (quoting personal interview with
Sutonus).
99. Sutonus, supra note 84, at 6.
100. GOmEZ, supra note 85, at 35-36.
101. Sutonus, supra note 84, at 13.
102. GoMEz, supra note 85, at 36.
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which the physician would bear the burden of proof, would justify acquit-
tal.
103
After the Supreme Court decision, policies and guidelines to govern the
administration of euthanasia were developed by several institutions, including
the KNMG, the University of Utrecht, and the health care services directors
of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Generally, such guidelines dictate procedures
for consultation with the family and hospital authorities after a patient has
requested euthanasia-setting timetables, documentation, and the actual
performance of the euthanasia. 10 4 The Amsterdam policy also specifically
sets forth procedures for post-mortem review, addressing the issue of the
physician's liability
In September, 1991, the first long-term study of the practice of euthanasia
in the Netherlands, commissioned by the Dutch government, was released.1
0 6
Researchers from four Dutch universities studied individuals who requested
euthanasia or suicide assistance from 1986 to 1989,107 with results that
surprised both sides of the debate.' The study found that about three
percent of all Dutch deaths-about 3,900 out of 129,000 deaths annually-are
caused by euthanasia, though thirty-five percent of all deaths involve the
withdrawal of care or the administration of potentially life-shortening
painkillers."0 9 These figures were far lower than predicted, lending credence
to the view that euthanasia can be controlled. At the same time, the official
study's figures contrasted with those of the Ministry of Justice, which showed
103. Id. at 37-38.
104. de Wachter, supra note 88, at 3318-19.
105. According to the Amsterdam policy, the following steps must be taken: (1) the coroner, who
must be contacted before a death certificate can be written, examines the reasons for the euthanasia and
whether it was performed with professional care; (2) the coroner reports to the district attorney; (3) the
police question the physician and investigate the circumstances of the euthanasia (the family is not
questioned unless something unusual is uncovered); (4) the district attorney decides whether an autopsy
is necessary; (5) the district attorney consults with the public health inspector; (6) the district attorney
submits a final report to the appropriate attorney general; (7) all five attorneys general and the secretary
general of the Ministry of Justice discuss the case and decide whether to prosecute or to dismiss the
case. Id. at 3319.
106. Simons, supra note 7.
107. Id. The researchers reviewed 7,000 deaths, interviewed 405 physicians, and arranged for 322
doctors to keep track of all deaths in their practices over a six-month period. Knox, supra note 17.
108. Knox, supra note 17.
109. Id. The study also revealed: In nearly two-thirds of the cases, the patients were estimated to
have two weeks or less to live when they asked to die. In eighty-three percent of the cases, the patients
first broached the subject of euthanasia, while in ten percent the physician first raised it. Doctors more
readily applied euthanasia when patients had just days to live; if life expectancy was three months or
more, doctors preferred to assist the patient in taking his own life. Simons, supra note 7.
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only 454 cases officially reported in 1990,"'0 indicating that physicians are
largely ignoring the existing guidelines."'
On February 9, 1993, after lengthy and contentious debate, the Dutch
Parliament approved (by a vote of 91 to 48 in the lower house) legislation that
codifies and strengthens the existing guidelines." 2 Scheduled to take effect
in 1994, the new law stops short of legalizing euthanasia, which is still
punishable under Article 293, but effectively immunizes from prosecution
physicians who follow a detailed set of rules." 13 Among other requirements,
these rules specify that the patient must voluntarily request euthanasia
repeatedly over a period of time, be mentally competent, and have a terminal
disease accompanied by unbearable physical or mental suffering." 4 The
physician must consult a colleague experienced in euthanasia and submit a
documented report stating the patient's medical history and the circumstances
of the euthanasia." 5
Two critics of Dutch euthanasia, the American physician Carlos Gomez,
author of the first detailed American study of the Dutch system of euthana-
sia, 1 6 and Richard Fenigsen, a Dutch cardiologist,' 7 argue that not only
are abuses inevitable and ongoing, but endemic to the practice of euthanasia.
Based on his analysis of twenty-six cases of euthanasia that took place
between 1985 and 1988, Dr. Gomez charges that the regulatory framework
governing euthanasia is a sham. In the vast majority of cases, self-reporting
by physicians does not occur, and even in instances where the district attorney
is notified, physicians are rarely brought to court."' The requirement that
physicians consult with another doctor is vague, and does not specify the
110. Dutch Study Brings Euthanasia Taboo Out into the Open, Reuters Library Report, Sept. 13,
1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
111. Id. Dutch proponents of euthanasia have been split over whether statutory legalization of
euthanasia would improve adherence to guidelines and accountability. Pieter V Admiraal, a Delft
oncologist and practitioner of euthanasia, says, "It wouldn't change much." Eugene Sutonus, the leading
defense attorney for physicians in euthanasia cases, worries that legalization will make euthanasia
"mechanical" and remove responsibility from doctors. Klazien Sybrandy, founder of the Information
Center for Voluntary Euthanasia, contends that the ambiguous legal status of euthanasia gives
prosecutors such discretion that physicians are discouraged from reporting. She argues that formal
legalization would encourage openness and reduce the potential for abuse. John Horgan, Death with
Dignity: The Dutch Explore the Limits of a Patient's Right to Die, Scl. AM., March 1991, at 17, 20.
112. Drozdiak, supra note 16.




116. See GoMEz, supra note 85.
117. See Richard Fenigsen, A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia, HASTINGS CENTER REP. (Special
Supp.), Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 22.
118. GoMEz, supra note 85, at 130.
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other physician's public function and accountability As a result, doctors who
do seek outside review before performing euthanasia do so to fulfill the legal
formality, not as a test of their clinical assessment.' 9
Dr. Fenigsen paints an even more frightening picture of the practice of
euthanasia, presenting a litany of abuses that he claims occur routinely- sloppy
diagnosis, misrepresentation of the family's wishes, hasty evaluation of the
patient's wishes, coercion of one spouse by the other, and coercion and
intimidation of patients by doctors and nurses.2 He claims that involuntary
active euthanasia has been widely performed on adults and children,"' and
that Holland has created a culture of propaganda in favor of death, applying
praise to the request to die, terming it "brave," "wise," and "progressive.'
' 22
Fenigsen reports that severely handicapped adults live in fear and uncertainty,
and that the practice of euthanasia has brought about an "ominous" change in
society, sending a message to the weak and dependent that "we wouldn't mind
getting rid of you.' 2
3
According to Dr. Gomez, the chaotic, extralegal state of affairs that existed
in the Netherlands derived from an unresolvable tension in public policy
between favoring greater autonomy and the unwillingness to dispense with
legal prohibitions against killing, no matter how well-intentioned.2 4 The
new Dutch law, despite retaining criminal penalties for assisting suicide, may
be an attempt to ameliorate that tension. While the Netherlands model of legal
euthanasia may be too idiosyncratic in its development to transplant to the
United States, the same unresolvable tension exists in our society, as
evidenced by the ongoing euthanasia debate and the near misses of Washing-
ton State's Initiative 119 and California's Proposition 161.
119. Id.
120. Fenigsen, supra note 117, at 22.
12i. Two cases illustrate what Fenigsen considers to be the dangerously tolerant attitude of the Dutch
medical profession. In 1985, a physician was arrested under suspicion of having performed involuntary
euthanasia on twenty patients at the De Terp nursing home in the Hague. Id. at 25. He was convicted
of three killings, but the charges were dismissed by a higher court after an intensive lobbying effort on
the physician's behalf by the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG) and other groups. Id. Likewise,
four nurses who admitted having secretly killed several unconscious patients won a dismissal of all
charges and an emotional televised thank you from the victims' parents. Id.
122. Id. at 24.
123. Id. at 26.
124. GoMEZ, supra note 85, at 131-32.
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B. Legislative Responses to Euthanasia
The first modem proposal for euthanasia legislation, made in the Ohio
legislature in 1906, provided that when an adult of sound mind had been
fatally hurt or was terminally ill, his physician would be permitted to ask him
in the presence of three witnesses if he wished to die.121 If the answer was
yes, three other physicians were required to confirm the original prognosis
before the individual could be put to death. 26 The bill was defeated by a
vote of twenty-three to seventy-nine.
27
In the 1930s, Great Britain and the United States witnessed a burst of pro-
euthanasia activity, including the founding of euthanasia societies on both
sides of the Atlantic. In 1936, a "Voluntary Euthanasia Bill" was introduced
into the House of Lords. 28 The bill permitted adult patients suffering from
an incurable and fatal illness to request euthanasia by signing a form in the
presence of two witnesses. This form, accompanied by medical certificates,
was then to be submitted to a "euthanasia referee" appointed by the Minister
of Health. The euthanasia referee was required to interview the patient, and
if satisfied that the patient sincerely desired death, he would issue a
certificate. The patient's application, the medical certificates, and the referee's
certificate would then go to a special court, which had the right to question
the referee, the physicians, and family members. If the court was satisfied, it
would issue two certificates, one to the patient and one to the physician,
allowing death to be administered in the presence of an official witness.'29
These cumbersome safeguards were intended by promoters of the bill to
mollify the opposition, '3 but the effect was just the opposite-it was
complained that the .safeguards created too much formality, destroying the
doctor-patient relationship.' Yale Kamisar has theorized that the stringency
of these safeguards was calculated with the expectation of pushing through a
second and less restrictive bill as soon as the first had sufficiently "educated"
public opinion. "'32
125. RUSSELL, supra note 42, at 61.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. JONATHAN GOULD & LORD CRAIGMYLE, YOUR DEATH WARRANT9 29 (1971).
129. Id. at 29-30.
130. WILLIAMS, supra note 25, at 334.
131. Id.
132. Kamisar, Non-Religious Views, supra note 25, at 1015. Kamisar supports this contention with
a quote from Lord Chorley during a 1950 House of Lords debate on another euthanasia measure:
Another objection is that the bill does not go far enough, because it applies only to adults
and does not apply to children who come into the world deaf, dumb and crippled, and
who have a much better cause than those for whom the Bill provides. That may be so,
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In the United States, a bill similar to the British bill was introduced and
rejected in the Nebraska legislature in 1937 133 A year later, the Euthanasia
Society of America was formed in New York, where a bill based on the
British model was introduced and defeated in 1939 i34 In 1947, a similar bill
was again introduced in the New York legislature and rejected. 3 By that
time, reports of the Nazi practice of euthanasia and medical experimentation
on human subjects were widespread, and offered support for the notion that
euthanasia, once legalized, could not be effectively controlled.
136
The next significant effort to pass a euthanasia bill did not take place until
1969, when the House of Lords debated a revised version of the 1936 bill.
The 1969 bill attempted to relax some of the formal procedures of the earlier
bill by permitting a patient to make a "declaration in advance" requesting the
administration of euthanasia in the event of an "irremediable condition,"
defined as a serious physical illness or impairment reasonably thought to be
incurable and "expected to cause him severe distress or render him incapable
of rational existence."'3 17 The bill required two physicians to verify the
patient's condition and two witnesses to the declaration, and it contained a
series of provisions that have become standard in subsequent legislative
proposals: the declaration may be revoked at any time by destruction or
cancellation; no physician or nurse is under any legal duty to participate in
euthanasia; no physician or nurse shall be found guilty of an offense in
connection with authorized euthanasia; and no insurance policy in force for
twelve months shall be vitiated by the administration of euthanasia to the
but we must go step by step.
Id. at 1016 (quoting 169 H.L. Deb. 551, 559 (1950)).
133. GOULD & CRAIGMYLE, supra note 128, at 30.
134. RUSSELL, supra note 42, at 74.
135. Id. at 95-96.
136. German Jews were at first excluded from euthanasia under the Nazis; it was originally
considered that "the blessing of euthanasia should be granted only to [true] Germans." Kamisar, Non-
Religious Views, supra note 25, at 1033 (quoting defendant Viktor Brack, Chief Administrative Officer
in Hitler's private chancellory, testifying at the Nuremberg Medical Trial, 1 Trials of War Criminals
Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10, 877-80 (1950)).
An examination of euthanasia in Nazi Germany by Dr. Leo Alexander describes propaganda efforts
to facilitate acceptance of euthanasia. In a high school textbook, for example, a mathematics problem
compared the cost of caring for the disabled with the cost of building new housing units or mamage-
allowance loans for newly married couples. Leo Alexander, Medical Science Under Dictatorship, in
DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA 571, 572 (Dennis J. Horan & David Mall eds., 1977). Alexander also
describes the resistance of Dutch physicians to the imposition of euthanasia by the Nazis. One hundred
Dutch physicians were sent to concentration camps to force the profession's compliance, but "not a
single euthanasia or nontherapeutic sterilization was recommended or participated in by any Dutch
physician." Id. at 586.
137. GOULD & CiAIGMYLE, supra note 128, at 139.
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insured. 13' The bill was ultimately defeated, forty to sixty-one, after a
lengthy debate. 139 Among the objections to the bill was that the declaration,
once renewed, was valid for life unless canceled or destroyed-no provision
had been made for revocation by a new declaration. Also, unlike the 1936 bill
and most subsequent proposals, the bill allowed euthanasia to be performed
on incompetent patients who had previously signed a declaration. Further, the
"irremediable" condition required by the bill was so vaguely defined that it
could apply to the loss of a limb, and it was never specified that the illness
be fatal. 140
The 1969 English bill was the first directive-type statute to be proposed,
and it provided the model for bills introduced in legislatures in Idaho, Oregon,
and Montana between 1969 and 1974.141 After the 1976 Quinlan142 deci-
sion, the development and proliferation of living wills statutes largely
preempted the euthanasia debate until the 1980s, when the Hemlock Society
and its founder, Derek Humphry, began their national campaign of euthanasia
advocacy 141 In 1988, a group called Americans Against Human Suffering
attempted to place a euthanasia initiative on the California ballot, but failed
to gather enough signatures. 144 Then, in 1991, Washington Citizens for
Death with Dignity, in coalition with other advocacy groups, placed an
"Initiative for Death with Dignity" on the Washington ballot. 45 Designated
"Initiative 119," the Washington measure came closer to enactment than any
previous euthanasia proposal, winning forty-six percent of the popular
vote. 146
Initiative 119 was a proposal to amend Washington's Natural Death
Act, 14'7 a living wills statute, to accommodate voluntary euthanasia, or
138. Id. at 139-41.
139. Id. at 63.
140. Id. at 33-35.
141. RUSSELL, supra note 42, at 192-94.
142. In re Quinlan, 335 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
143. HUMPHRY, supra note 41, at 107-08.
144. Allan Parachmi, The California Humane and Dignified Death Initiative, 19 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. (Special Supp.), Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 10.
145. Michael McCarthy, Euthanasia on the Ballot, Voters in Washington State May Endorse Right
to Die, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1991, at Z12. Washington is one of 26 states allowing the adoption of
statutory reform by direct election through initiatives. Two states allow initiatives only for constitutional
amendment. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1510 (1990).
146. Jane Gross, Voters Turn Down Legal Euthanasia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at AI0. With 99%
of the vote tabulated, there were 701,440 votes against the initiative (54%), 606,039 in favor (46%). Id.
147. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 70.122.010-.905 (1990). Initiative 119 also included two proposals
relating to passive euthanasia. The first categorized "artificially administered nutrition and hydration"
as a "life-sustaining procedure," allowing its withdrawal if requested in a living will. The second
included "irreversible coma" and "persistent vegetative state" in the definition of "terminal conditions,"
allowing life-sustaining procedures to be withdrawn or withheld from patients in those conditions.
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"physician aid-in-dying" as it was called in the initiative. Only competent
patients with six months or less to live (in the written opinion of two
examining physicians) would be eligible for aid-in-dying, which must be
requested solely by the patient in the presence of two disinterested witness-
es. "'48 An aid-in-dying directive could only be executed at the time euthana-
sia was requested, not in advance. 4 9 In addition, no physician would be
compelled to provide aid-in-dying; physicians who object to the practice
would be obliged only to make a good faith effort to transfer the patient to a
physician who would perform the service. 5 ' Other provisions were designed
to allow the patient to revoke the directive at any time, to ensure that life
insurance is not impaired, and to provide criminal penalties for interference
with a directive or the revocation of a directive."'
Initiative 119 was carefully drafted to permit voluntary euthanasia for a
narrow range of cases with a moderate degree of bureaucratic oversight. The
restriction of euthanasia to competent patients would prevent its use by (or
on) victims of Alzheimer's disease, the senile, the mentally ill, or children.
Comatose patients and patients in a persistent vegetative state would also be
ineligible; advance directives by such patients would only allow the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.
California's Proposition 161, the "California Death with Dignity Act,"'52
on the ballot in 1992, was a revision of the 1988 bill proposed in that
state. 53 Although it was designed to improve upon the procedural safe-
guards in the Washington initiative, its provisions created new possibilities for
abuse. For example, the Washington measure failed to provide for any waiting
time or cooling-off period between execution of the aid-m-dying directive and
the administration of euthanasia. The California bill attempted to remedy this
problem by requiring the directive to be executed and witnessed in ad-
vance.154 However, under the California bill, the directive could have been
executed years before death, and no witness was required for the final request
for death or at the time of death. 55 Also, while the Washington measure
made no special provision for nursing home patients, the California bill
Initiative for Death with Dignity § 2 (Washington Committee for Death with Dignity 1991) [hereinafter
Initiative 119], amending WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.020(4), (7) (1990).
148. Initiative 119, supra note 147, §§ 2, 3.
149. Id. § i0, amending WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.100 (1990).
150. Id. § 6(2), amending WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.060(2) (1990).
151. Id. §§ 4(1), 7(2), 9, amending WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.122.040(1), .070(2), and .090 (1990).
152. The California Death with Dignity Act (Californians Against Human Suffering 1992)
[hereinafter Proposition 161].
153. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
154. Proposition 161 § 2525.3.
155. Id. §§ 2525.2(i), 2525.7.
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required that in such cases a patient advocate or ombudsman designated by
the state Department of Aging be a witness to the directive. 56 However, the
state official need only be present when the directive is signed, not when it
is carried out."57 The California measure was also flawed by its failure to
contain a requirement that the patient be experiencing a certain level of pain
and suffering before the directive could be made. Finally, its definition of
"terminal condition" was so vague as to include serious, but-not immediately
life-threatening illnesses, like diabetes."'
In 1992, euthanasia bills were also introduced in the state legislatures of
Iowa, Maine, Michigan, and New Hampshire. The Iowa'59 and Maine
61
bills closely track Proposition 161. The Michigan bill 6 1 contains a number
of innovative safeguards. First, the directive must be certified within seven
days of execution by a psychologist or psychiatrist, attesting that the patient
is of sound mind and not suffering from depression. 62 Second, the attending
physician must have attended the patient for at least six months. 63 Third,
the patient must be determined to be suffering from both a terminal illness
and physical pain so great that its elimination would render the patient
unconscious. 64 Fourth, sixty days must pass between the execution of the
directive and the euthanasia, 1 65 and the patient must request euthanasia at
least twice, with seven days between each request. 66 Fifth, each request
must be videotaped and witnessed by two individuals, and the performance of
euthanasia must also be videotaped. 67 Finally, the decision of the attending
physician to administer euthanasia must be reviewed and approved by at least
two members of a three-member committee appointed by the county medical
examiner or the administrator of the health facility where the patient is
dying. 16' This complex and unwieldy procedure was criticized by both pro-
and anti-euthanasia forces. 169 Kevorkian commented, "You don't have a law
156. Id. § 2525.4.
157. Id.
158. Id. § 2525.20).
159. Assistance-in-Dying Act, Iowa Senate, Sen. File 2066 (1992).
160. An Act Regarding the Terminally III, Maine Senate, 2nd Sess., S.P. 885, Legislative Doc. No.
2257 (1992).
161. Death with Dignity Act of 1992, H.R. 5415, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess., Mich. (1992).
162. Id. § 3(4).
163. Id. § 4(b).
164. Id. § 4(c).
165. Id. § 4(d).
166. Id. § 4(e), (e)(ii).
167. Id. § 4(e)(iii), (k).
168. Id. § 4(h).
169. Price, supra note 7.
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telling doctors how to perform gallbladder operations or any other surger-
ies. ' ' 1
70
The New Hampshire measure171 takes a unique approach. Upon request
by a patient determined to be terminally ill by two physicians, the attending
physician may prescribe a lethal dose of medication that the patient may self-
administer at the time and place and in the manner of his choosing. 7 2
Before acceding to the patient's request, the physician must consult with an
institutional or state ethics committee, which will review the case.' 73
Despite their attempts to strike an adequate balance between respect for
patient autonomy and societal safeguards, each of these four legislative
efforts, like Initiative 119 and Proposition 161, is still susceptible of abuse,
and raises the question, again, of whether euthanasia legislation is a
fundamentally unsound idea. On the one hand, it is possible to imagine a safe
and compassionate administration of euthanasia, with physicians and families
working together to create a supportive and loving environment in which to
make the crucial decision about the appropriateness of euthanasia. This ideal
may have been accomplished in some cases in the Netherlands, as well as in
the case of Dr. Quill, where the physician's longstanding relationship with the
patient provided a foundation for his decision to accede to her request for
assistance with suicide. On the other hand, it is equally possible, and perhaps
closer to reality, to imagine deathbed scenes fraught with anxiety, conflict,
and mistrust. As ethicist Leon Kass hypothesized:
Imagine the scene: you are old, poor, in failing health, and alone in the
world; you are brought to the city hospital with fractured ribs and
pneumonia. The nurse or intern enters late at night with a syringe full of
yellow stuff for your intravenous drip. How soundly will you sleep? It will
not matter that your doctor has never yet put anyone to death; that he is
legally entitled to do so will make a world of difference.'74
The realities of terminal care and dying in our present health care system
constitute the strongest argument against legalizing euthanasia. A system
which fails to care adequately for the living must not be empowered with a
license to kill.
170. Id. (quoting Dr. Jack Kevorkian).
171. Death with Dignity Act, H.R 1275, 152d Leg., Reg. Sess., N.H. (1992). [House Bill 92-2332
(1992)].
172. Id. § 137-K:3(I).
173. Id. § 137-K:4.
174. Euthanasia: Final Exit, Final Excuse, FiRST THINGs, Dec. 1991, at 4, 8 (quoting Leon Kass in
an editorial).
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III. EUTHANASIA AND THE HEALTH CARE CRISIS
In formulating public policy on euthanasia, the benefits of legalization must
be balanced against the harms legalization may entail. Public policy is not
created in a vacuum; arguments for euthanasia that rely on autonomy or mercy
are persuasive when applied to specific cases, but a public policy to lift the
general prohibition on euthanasia must take societal consequences into
account. If legalized, euthanasia would be practiced within a health care
system that is reaching a critical state: rising costs in all areas of the industry
and the care of the uninsured and underinsured have placed onerous burdens
on hospitals, employers, and federal and state governments. An examination
of euthanasia through the lens of the health care dilemma moves the debate
from the context of issues of autonomy and mercy into the sphere of
externalities-systemic pressures and the quotidian realities of the health care
industry If euthanasia is to be seriously considered as an addition to the
canon of medical procedures to be performed within that system, it must be
assessed in the context of our health care institutions.
This Part examines what the legalization of voluntary euthanasia might
mean in the context of our health care system. The first section argues that
our present health care system is incapable of safely accommodating
euthanasia. The second section argues that reform of the management of death
in health care institutions would preempt the need for legal euthanasia.
A. The Cost Factor
A presumption in favor of treatment remains strong in the practice of
medicine. Traditionally, health care professionals have tended to regard the
cost of treatment as irrelevant to their obligation to act for the good of their
patients.'75 Today, however, the rising cost of health care has forced the
federal and state governments, private insurers, and employers to set limits on
health care coverage.176 Thirty-four to thirty-seven million Americans are
without medical insurance, including entire families with full-time job
holders. 7 7 Medical indigence is a "silent, largely invisible epidemic,"'7 8
spreading quickly-the number of Americans with private coverage of hospital
175. THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 123 (1987).
176. Id.
177. Edwin Chen, Medical Care Reform May Be Reaching Turning Point, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1991
(Sunday final ed.), at Al.
178. Emily Fnedman, The Torturer's Horse, 261 JAMA 1481, 1481-82 (1991).
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costs continues to decrease at the rate of one million per year. 179 In 1989,
hospitals provided $11.1 billion in uncompensated care. Among the costliest
afflictions were those that often stem from poverty- AIDS, drug abuse, and
problem pregnanies."'
The financial survival of health care institutions now depends directly on
controlling costs generated by individual patient care decisions.'' Cost
containment already affects patient decision making, particularly when health
insurance benefits fail to keep pace with the cost of treatment. Patients are
sometimes forced to forego beneficial treatments they wish to receive. 182 For
the twenty-six million poor, disabled, and elderly Americans who receive
health care through Medicaid,'83 the "unrealistically low" provider reim-
bursement levels mean limited access to treatment. 8 4 For the uninsured,
receiving access to any form of health care is problematic. More and more
hospitals are faced with the choice of caring for all the uninsured and going
under financially, or turning at least some of them away i85 The cost of care
of the uninsured has become a significant factor in the increase in the cost of
care for everyone, 18 6 and as cost containment measures are implemented in
Medicaid and private health insurance programs, the quality of care de-
clines.'87
The medically indigent are most at risk of abuse in a scheme of legal
euthanasia. The uninsured poor, who include the very elderly, AIDS patients,
the homeless, and the mentally ill, 88 receive not only diminished access to
health care providers, but fewer services once entry to the health care system
is achieved. 8 9 The uninsured usually receive no more than last-minute
interventions in emergency departments, and the availability of non-emergency
care for indigents continues to erode. 90
179. Id.
180. Emily Friedman, The Uninsured: From Dilemma to Crisis, 265 JAMA 2491, 2491 (1991).
181. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, INSTITUTIONAL PROTOCOLS FOR
DECISIONS ABouT LIFE-SusTAINING TREATMENTS 4 (1988).
182. Id.
183. Gail R. Wilensky, From the Health Care Financing Administration, 265 JAMA 2461, 2461
(1991).
184. James S. Todd et al., Health Access Amenca-Strengthenng the U.S. Health Care System, 265
JAMA 2503, 2504 (1991).
185. Friedman, supra note 180, at 2494.
186. Id.
187. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, LIFE-SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES AND
THE ELDERLY 18 (1987) [hereinafter OTA].
188. Friedman, supra note 178, at 1481.
189. Mark B. Wenneker et al., The Association of Payer with Utilization of Cardiac Procedures in
Massachusetts, 264 JAMA 1255, 1255 (1990).
190. Friedman, supra note 178, at 1481.
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For indigent patients, particularly those without family members willing to
challenge health care providers to maintain a reasonable standard of care, the
option of euthanasia is fraught with danger. An institution providing an
indigent patient with care would be called upon to resist substantial incentives
to encourage the patient to avail himself of euthanasia, including financial
savings and the release of resources to insured patients. The same incentives
already exist for institutions to influence the decision to withhold or withdraw
treatment from a terminally ill indigent patient. The possible statistical
correlation between insurance status and withholding or withdrawal of
treatment should be studied. The changing policies of health care institutions
in response to the Patient Self-Determination Act and the likely increase in
execution of advance directives by inpatients may shed light on this question,
and consequently illuminate the potential for abuse under legal euthanasia.
Even under circumstances of non-indigence, when a patient is dying or
terminally ill, family members, physicians, and nurses are under great physical
and psychological stresses. 91 Family members are dealing with anticipatory
grief, financial burdens, and excessive demands on their time, and involve-
ment in treatment decisions is likely to be filled with anxiety and guilt. 92
Health care professionals must deal with the emotional burdens of the ill
patient and the grieving family, and with constant reminders of their own
mortality 193 As cost containment becomes a factor in the decision whether
or not to offer specific life-saving treatment, this already tense environment
is likely to become charged with a sense of futility and hopelessness.
If voluntary euthanasia is legalized before the financial stresses in our
health care system are reasonably ameliorated, the potential for abuse is great.
As ethicist Tom Beauchamp warns, "[T]he aged will be even more neglectable
and neglected than they now are, [and] doctors would have appreciably
reduced fears of actively injecting fatal doses whenever it seemed to them
propitious to do so ,,194 Pressures on terminally ill patients to "get it
over with" and spare their loved ones expense and misery will be exerted by
families and caregivers, and such subtle (or unsubtle) coercion would hardly
be discouraged by hospitals stretching tight budgets. If one takes into account
the fact that more than 10,000 American adults remain in nursing homes and
hospitals in vegetative comas at the public expense of $350 million per
191. OTA, supra note 187, at 25.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Tom L. Beauchamp, A Reply to Rachels on Active and Passive Euthanasia, in ETHICAL ISSUES,
supra note 23, at 253.
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year, 95 the potential utility of euthanasia as a cost containment device
becomes clear.
Comparison with health care in the Netherlands reveals the inadvisability
of transplanting euthanasia to the United States. According to Teresa Takken,
a Catholic nun and ethicist from the University of Utrecht, Holland's
comprehensive health care and welfare system probably keeps requests for
euthanasia at a minimum and makes abuses unlikely '96 But, she insists,
"We have no business even talking about euthanasia here [in the United
States] until we have health care for all, and even housing for all."
97
Ethicist Corrine Bayley agrees that economic considerations could corrupt
decisions involving euthanasia in the United States, and adds that American
physicians generally have much shorter term and less trusting relationships
with their patients than Dutch physicians, and so are less equipped to cope
with requests for euthanasia.' Dr. Carlos Gomez, who argues that signifi-
cant abuses have taken place in the Netherlands, fears that "euthanasia will
be used, as it sometimes is in Holland, as a tool of social and economic
control Poor people, especially in this country where we deny medical
services to many of them, are the most vulnerable to be euthanized."' 99
Moreover, sanctioning physicians to kill patients may rob the health care
establishment of the impetus to make serious movement toward reform of the
care of the terminally ill, and may serve as a pressure valve, enabling the
system to avoid the financial and ethical dilemmas now crying out to be
addressed.
B. The Care of the Dying
The power of medicine to extend life under circumstances of technological
dependency, pain, incompetency, and coma is widely feared.200 Treatment
in hospitals has become increasingly fragmented, and people who two decades
ago might have died quietly at home or in the company of a trusted family
doctor today die surrounded by machines and teams of specialists they hardly
know 201 Yet, concurrent with the development of life-sustaining technology
195. Shaw, supra note 14, at 97-98.
196. Horgan, supra note 111, at 20.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Egan, supra note 6.
200. Callahan, supra note 36, at 4.
201. Elisabeth Rosenthal, In Matters of Life and Death, the Dying Take Control, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
18, 1991, § 4, at I. In an intensive care unit, a cancer patient's general practitioner is a bystander to the




has been the growth of awareness that the management of death in health care
institutions must be reformed. The general acceptance by the medical
profession of the concept of patient autonomy and of the participation of
patients and their families in health care decision making is one positive
development.
Another significant development has been the growth of the hospice
movement and the proliferation of hospice programs throughout the coun-
try 202 The hospice concept, which can be realized in a patient's home or in
institutions, was created to remedy the sense of isolation, depersonalization,
and loss of control that dying patients suffer in hospitals, surrounded by
medical technology 203 When a patient begins hospice care, all extraordinary
or life-sustaining measures are discontinued, and the focus of treatment is on
palliative care only-comfort and symptom control. 2 4 Hospice is intended
to meet the physical, social, psychological, and spiritual needs of both the
dying patient and family,2 5 and provides a caring response to many pat-
ients' fears of pain, of dying alone, and of the tyranny of medical technolo-
gy 206
Voluntary euthanasia, on the other hand, may provide not release from
medical technology, but a "deceptively easy technological 'quick fix' the
ultimate triumph of technical virtuosity over humane medicine,' 2 7 as it may
be a symptom of our cultural avoidance of the responsibility to come to terms
with death and dying.208 As Dr. Elisabeth Kubler-Ross wrote more than
twenty years ago, the further that science advances, "the more we seem to
fear and deny the reality of death. 20 9 Physicians and nurses often become
neglectful of patients once they have been diagnosed as terminal and may
separate themselves mentally and physically from the dying patient.
21 0
Hospitals, which are primarily focused on preserving life, curing, diagnosis,
and treating illness, tend to conceal death.2 ' If the option of ending a
202. See Vande Cox, The Hospice Concept: Dying as a Part ofLiving, NURSING HOMES AND SENIOR
CITIZEN CARE, July-Aug. 1988, at 29, 29.
203. Id. at 29-30.
204. See id. at 30. The hospice patient, however, "retains the option to reinstate treatment at any
phase of his illness." Id. at 32.
205. Id. at 3 1.
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terminally ill person's life early is available to physicians and hospitals, the
quality of care given to such patients is unlikely to improve.212
If care of the dying were more humanely managed, there would be little
need for euthanasia. 13 In a 1989 article in the New England Journal of
Medicine, twelve physicians set forth views concerning treatment of
hopelessly ill patients.214 The article gained notoriety through the endorse-
ment of physician-assisted suicide by ten of the twelve physicians,215 but the
article also addressed the inadequacies of current modes of care for the dying
and proposed a number of feasible and cost-effective reforms. Among these
proposals were the initiation of timely discussions with patients about dying,
the solicitation and execution of advance directives, the facilitation of dying
at home, the development of hospice care, the discouragement of intensive
care units for dying patients, the formulation by physicians of flexible and
adjustable programs of care, the training of physicians in care of the dying,
and the aggressive use of painkillers, even if death is thereby hastened.2 6
Many of these reforms are already, to varying degrees, in practice in many
parts of the country Doctors are far more likely now than ever before to
honor patients' wishes to forego aggressive treatment; the hospice movement
uses sophisticated technology to keep terminal patients pain free and
comfortable; and physicians are becoming more comfortable with administer-
ing increased morphine doses to control pain.217 There is still much to be
accomplished. Radical changes in the care of the terminally ill are needed,
and should be an integral part of any health care reform package to come out
of the United States Congress.
CONCLUSION
Voluntary euthanasia may ultimately be viewed as a backlash against a
medical profession that failed to address the needs of the terminally ill, or it
may be an idea whose time has come. Over the coming decades, the elderly
population will increase dramatically, and if the spread of AIDS and social
212. Stephen Sapp, Reflection, in AcTIvE EUTHANASIA, supra note 14, at 88, 90.
213. Ronald E. Cranford, Reflection, in AcTIVE EUTHANASIA, supra note 14, at 80, 81.
214. Sidney H. Wanzer et al., The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 320
NEw ENG. J. MED. 844 (1989).
215. Id. at 848. The acceptance of assisted suicide under certain conditions by the ten physicians is
couched in terms that would limit the procedure to exceptional cases: "If care is administered properly
at the end of life, only the rare patient should be so distressed that he or she desires to commit suicide."
Id. at 847.
216. Id. at 844-49.
217. Rosenthal, supra note 201, at 1-2.
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ills associated with poverty continues unabated, our health care system will
be burdened far beyond its present capacity If reforms are not undertaken to
ensure access to adequate health care for all Americans and to provide for
more compassionate policies and strategies in the care of the dying, voluntary
euthanasia may one day be seen, for the terminally ill and their families, as
presumptively correct-the only way out of a hellish situation.
Even in the absence of legal voluntary euthanasia, some physicians will
continue to assist patients to end their lives. In certain cases, such assistance
may be justified, just as mercy killing may, under extreme circumstances, be
so morally justified as to warrant acquittal in court. Yet to authorize
euthanasia legislatively would be to create social policy based on the
exceptional situation. Hard cases do indeed make bad law Passing legislation
to permit the few justifiable cases of euthanasia, at the expense of potentially
opening the door to widespread abuses, is bad law and irresponsible social
policy
